This paper develops tools for welfare and revenue analyses of Bayes-Nash equilibria in asymmetric auctions with single-dimensional agents. We employ these tools to derive price of anarchy results for social welfare and revenue. Our approach separates the standard smoothness framework [e.g., Syrgkanis and Tardos 2013] into two distinct parts. The first part, value covering, employs best-response analysis to individually relate each agent's expected price for allocation and welfare in any Bayes-Nash equilibrium. The second part, revenue covering, uses properties of an auction's rules and feasibility constraints to relate the revenue of the auction to the agents' expected prices for allocation (not necessarily in equilibrium). Because value covering holds for any equilibrium, proving an auction is revenue covered is a sufficient condition for approximating optimal welfare, and under the right conditions, the optimal revenue. In mechanisms with reserve prices, our welfare results show approximation with respect to the optimal mechanism with the same reserves.
INTRODUCTION
The first step of a classical microeconomic analysis is to solve for equilibrium. Consequently, such analysis is restricted to settings for which equilibrium is analytically tractable; these settings are often disappointingly idealistic. Methods from the price of anarchy provide an alternative approach. Instead of solving for equilibrium, properties of equilibrium can be quantified from consequences of best response. These methods have been primarily employed for analyzing social welfare. While welfare is a fundamental economic objective, there are many other properties of economic systems that are important to understand. This paper gives methods for analyzing the price of anarchy for revenue.
Equilibrium requires that each agent's strategy be a best response to the strategies of others. A typical price-of-anarchy analysis obtains a bound on the social welfare (the sum of the revenue and all agent utilities) from a lower bound an agent's utility implied by best response. Notice that the agents themselves are each directly attempting to optimize a term in the objective. This property makes social welfare special among objectives. Can simple best-response arguments be used to quantify and com-pare other objectives? This paper considers the objective of revenue, i.e., the sum of the agent payments. Notice that each agent's payment appears negatively in her utility and, therefore, she prefers smaller payments; collectively the agents prefer smaller revenue.
The agenda of this paper parallels a recent trend in mechanism design. Mechanism design looks at identifying a mechanism with optimal performance in equilibrium. Optimal mechanisms tend to be complicated and impractical; consequently, a recent branch of mechanism design has looked at quantifying the loss between simple mechanisms and optimal mechanisms. These simple (designed) mechanisms have carefully constructed equilibrium (typically, the truthtelling equilibrium). The restriction to truthtelling equilibrium, though convenient in theory, is problematic in practice [Ausubel and Milgrom 2006] . In particular, this truthtelling equilibrium is specific to an ideal agent model and tends to be especially non-robust to out-of-model phenomena. The price of anarchy literature instead considers the analysis of the performance of simple mechanisms absent a carefully constructed equilibrium.
As an example, consider the single-item first-price auction, in which agents place sealed bids, the auctioneer selects the highest bidder to win, and the winner pays her bid. The fundamental tradeoff faced by the agents in selecting a bidding strategy is that higher bids correspond to higher chance of winning (which is good) but higher payments (which is bad). This first-price auction is the most fundamental auction in practice and it is the role of auction theory to understand its performance. When the agents' values for the item are drawn independently and identically then first-price equilibria are well-behaved: the symmetry of the setting enables the easy solving for equilibrium [Krishna 2009 ], the equilibrium is unique [Chawla and Hartline 2013; Lebrun 2006; Maskin and Riley 2003] , and the highest valued agent always wins (i.e., the social welfare is maximized). When the agents' values are non-identically distributed, analytically solving for equilibrium is notoriously difficult. For example, Vickrey [1961] posed the question of solving for equilibrium with two agents with values drawn uniformly from distinct intervals; this problem was finally resolved half a century later by Kaplan and Zamir [2012] .
The intractibility of solving analytically for equilibrium is foremost a problem of theory. It does not rule out BNE as a practical concept: agents can reach equilibrium by playing learning strategies, numerically solving the differential equations implied by equilibrium, etc. Free from the demands of theoretical analysis, agents may use these heuristic techniques, may focus on specific instances of their optimization problem, and may employ algorithmic techniques such as those developed by Jiang and Leyton-Brown [2010] , rather than pursuing a general, analytical characterization.
Price-of-anarchy analysis allows us to make general statements about equilibrium nonetheless. For example, a recent analysis of Syrgkanis and Tardos [2013] shows that the first-price auction's social welfare in equilibrium is at least an e/(e − 1) ≈ 1.58 approximation to the optimal social welfare, and moreover, this bound continues to hold if multiple items are sold simultaneously by independent first-price auctions. Importantly, this price-of-anarchy analysis sidesteps the intractability of solving for equilibrium and instead derives its bounds from simple best-response arguments.
Methods
Our analysis breaks down the problem of analyzing welfare and revenue into two parts. The first part, value covering, considers each agent individually and requires that an agent's contribution to BNE welfare and the expected price for allocation she faces combine to approximate her contribution to the welfare in the optimal mechanism. It uses only properties of BNE. The second part, revenue covering, captures the relevant mechanism-specific details and considers the auction rules in aggregate across the agents. It requires that the auction's expected revenue approximately covers the effective prices for an allocation across agents. The two parts combine to give a price of anarchy bounds for welfare. More importantly, proving these welfare bounds in this manner allows us to extend the same approximation with reserve prices and to revenue.
Our analysis begins by translating the payments in any auction into equivalent bids: the first-price bids or payments if the payment rule of the mechanism used first-price semantics. Beyond first-price auctions, it allows us to simplify the action space and the optimization problem a bidder faces into effectively the same problem a bidder in the first price auction faces. From this standard viewpoint we show that an agent's welfare in Bayes-Nash equilibria of any auction and her equivalent bid thresholds, combine to cover an (e − 1)/e fraction of her welfare in the optimal mechanism. Intuitively, either the agent's welfare is high, or the price she has to pay for allocation is high relative to her value for service.
We then make use of the characterization of revenue in Bayes-Nash equilibrium of Myerson [1981] to reduce revenue to welfare. Value covering has a direct analog in terms of positive virtual values. Combined with revenue covering, this implies an approximation result for the virtual welfare for agents with positive virtual values. We provide several ways to then prove that a revenue covered mechanism has approximately optimal revenue for bidders with regular distributions.
Results
For single-item and matroid auctions (where the feasibility constraint is given by a matroid set system), we give welfare and revenue price of anarchy results with both first-price and all-pay payment semantics. The first-price variants of these auctions (a) solicit bids, (b) choose an outcome to optimize the sum of the reported bids of served agents, and (c) charge the agents that are served their bids. These results are compatible with reserve prices. The all-pay variants of these auctions (a) solicit bids, (b) choose an outcome to optimize the sum of the reported bids of served agents, and (c) charge all agents their bids.
Welfare. In first-price auctions, we show that the price of anarchy for welfare is at most 2e/(e − 1), with or without reserves. These results also extend to the generalized first-price position auction. For all-pay auctions in the above environments, the price of anarchy for welfare is 3e/(e − 1). Tighter versions of these results with no reserves are known via Syrgkanis and Tardos [2013] ; the results with reserves are new.
Revenue. For first-price auctions with monopoly reserves in regular, singleparameter environments, we show that the price of anarchy for revenue is at most 2e/(e − 1). The same bound holds in the generalized first-price position auction with monopoly reserves. If instead of reserves each bidder must compete with at least one duplicate bidder, the price of anarchy for revenue in first-price auctions is at most 3e/(e − 1); in all-pay auctions, at most 4e/(e − 1).
Simultaneous Composition. We also show via an extension theorem that the above bounds hold when auctions are run simultaneously if agents are unit-demand and single-valued across the outcomes of the auctions.
Related Work
Understanding welfare in games without solving for equilibrium is a central theme in the smooth games framework of Roughgarden [2009] and the smooth mechanisms extension of Syrgkanis and Tardos [2013] . Using this framework, one can show many properties based on a simple, full-information property, smoothness. In addition, Syrgkanis and Tardos [2013] show that the smoothness guarantees hold under sequential and simultaneous composition. Our framework differs from smoothness in three notable ways. First, we decompose smoothness into two components, value-and revenue-covering, and argue about individual agents approximating their contribution to the optimal welfare and revenue. Second, we only consider the Bayesian setting, which allows us to use the BNE characterization for revenue, and allows us to relate other auctions to the first-price auction via equivalent bids. Third, equivalent bids allow us to eschew the deviations in the definitions of smoothness.
There have been a number of papers looking at revenue guarantees for the welfareoptimal Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism in asymmetric settings. Hartline and Roughgarden [2009] show that VCG with monopoly reserves or duplicate bidders achieves revenue that is a constant approximation to the revenue optimal auction. Dhangwatnotai et al. [2010] show that the single-sample mechanism, which is essentially VCG with a reserve sampled from all of the distributions of the bidders, achieves approximately optimal revenue in broader settings. Roughgarden et al. [2012] showed that in broader environments, including matching settings, limiting the supply of items in relation to the number of bidders gives a constant approximation to the optimal auction.
In the economics literature, a number of papers have explored properties of asymmetric first-price auctions. Kirkegaard [2009] shows that understanding the ratios of expected payoffs in equilibrium can be easier than understanding equilibrium and lead to insights about equilibria. Kirkegaard [2012] shows that some properties of distributions can be used to compare revenue of the first price auction to revenue of the second price auction. Lebrun [2006] and Maskin and Riley [2003] establish equilibrium uniqueness in the asymmetric setting with some assumptions on the distributions of agents.
PRELIMINARIES
Bayesian Mechanisms. This paper considers mechanisms for n single-dimensional agents with linear utility. Each agent has a private value for service, v i , drawn independently from a distribution F i over V i , the agent's valuation space. We write F = i F i and V = i V i to denote the joint value distribution and space of value profiles, respectively. A mechanism consists of an allocation rulex and a payment rulẽ p, mapping actions of agents to allocations and payments respectively. Each agent i draws their private value v i from F i and selects an action according to some strategy s i : V i → A i , where A i is the set of possible actions for i. We write s = (s 1 , . . . , s n ) to denote the vector of agents' strategies. Given the actions a = (a 1 , . . . , a n ) selected by each agent, the mechanism computesx(a) andp(a). Each agent's utility is
Mechanisms typically operate with constraints on permissible allocations. A feasibility environment is a set of feasible allocation vectors. Mechanisms for a feasibility environment choose only allocations from the feasible set. The simplest example is a single-item auction, in which at most one person at a time can be served. This paper assumes feasibility environments are downward-closed: if (x 1 , . . . , x k , . . . , x n ) is feasible, so is (x 1 , . . . , 0, . . . , x n ). We will often consider the special case of matroid environments, in which the set of feasible allocations correspond to the independent sets of a matroid set system. Given a strategy profile s, we often consider the expected allocation and payment an agent faces from choosing some action a i ∈ A i , with expectation taken with respect to other agents' values and actions induced by s. We treat s as implicit and writẽ
, withp i (a i ) andũ i (a i ) defined analogously. Given s, we also consider values as inducing payments and allocations. We write x(v) =x(s(v)) and p(v) =p(s(v)), respectively. Furthermore, we can denote agent i's interim allocation probability and payment by
. We define u(v) and u i (v i ) similarly. In general, we use a tilde to denote outcomes induced by actions, and omit the tilde when indicating outcomes induced by values. We refer tox as the bid allocation rule, to distinguish it from x, the allocation rule. We adopt a similar convention with other notation.
Bayes-Nash Equilibrium. A strategy profile s is in Bayes-Nash equilibrium (BNE) if for all agents i, s i (v i ) maximizes i's interim utility, taken in expectation with respect to other agents' value distributions F −i and their actions induced by s. That is, for all i, v i , and alternative actions a :
We consider only mechanisms where agents can gain from participation, regardless of their value -that is, we require that mechanisms be interim individually rational. We implement this by assuming each agent can withdraw from the mechanism. Specifically, define a withdraw action as any action w i such thatx i (w i , a −i ) = 0 and p i (w i , a −i ) = 0 for any value of a −i . We assume all mechanisms have at least one such action for each agent. In any BNE, each agent has the option to withdraw and must therefore get nonnegative utility. Myerson [1981] characterizes the interim allocation and payment rules that arise in BNE. These results are summarized in the following theorem. THEOREM 2.1 (MYERSON 1981). For any mechanism and value distribution F,
(3) (revenue equivalence) Mechanisms and equilibria which result in the same interim allocation rule x(v) must therefore have the same interim payments as well.
Mechanism Design Objectives. We consider the problem of maximizing two main objectives in BNE: expected welfare and expected revenue. The revenue of a mechanism M is the total payment of all agents. Mechanism M 's expected revenue for v ∼ F in a given Bayes-Nash equilibrium s is denoted REV
. The welfare of a mechanism M is the total utility of all participants including the auctioneer; its expected welfare is denoted WELFARE
We will also refer to welfare throughout the paper as surplus.
Our welfare benchmark is pointwise-optimal feasible allocation. That is, we seek to approximate WELFARE
This can be implemented via the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism. We measure a mechanism M 's welfare performance by the Bayesian price of anarchy for welfare, given by
To understand revenue, we rely on the alternate characterization derived in Myerson [1981] :
Using this result, Myerson [1981] derives the revenue-optimal mechanism for any value distribution F. This mechanism is parameterized by the value distribution F, and the optimality is in expectation over v ∼ F. We specifically consider distributions where φ i (v i ) is monotone in v i for each i. Such distributions are said to be regular. If each agent has a regular distribution, then the revenue-optimal mechanism selects the allocation which maximizes i φ i (v i )x i (v). We will seek to minimize the Bayesian price of anarchy for revenue, max F∈R,s∈BNE(M,F) REV(OPT F )/REV(M ), where R is the
Bid Allocation Rule set of regular distributions and OPT F is the Bayesian revenue-optimal mechanism for value distribution F.
SINGLE-ITEM FIRST PRICE AUCTION WITH RESERVES
We begin by analyzing the single-item first price auction with per-bidder reserves, and show that it approximates the welfare of the optimal mechanism with the same reserves. With zeroed reserves, this result implies that the welfare of the first-price auction with no reserves approximates the welfare of the welfare optimal auction. We will then connect these results to revenue approximation results, and taking the reserves to be the monopoly reserves gives revenue (and welfare) approximation results with respect to the revenue optimal mechanism.
Welfare
We now aim to show that the welfare and revenue of the first price auction together approximate the welfare of the optimal auction:
Our proof will proceed by first analyzing the optimization problem of the bidder, then relating that optimization problem to welfare and revenue. We will conclude with the following theorem.
THEOREM 3.1. The welfare in any BNE of the first price auction with reserves r is at least a 2e e−1 -approximation to the welfare of the welfare optimal mechanism that serves no agent with v i < r i .
Note that equation (1) is quite similar to the inequality in the smooth games and mechanism frameworks [Syrgkanis and Tardos 2013; Roughgarden 2009 ]. It differs primarily in that we are not defining a specific deviation but deriving bounds explicitly from BNE. Moreover we show that (a variant of) equation (1) holds in the interim for every bidder and realized valuation, rather than only in aggregate.
A bidder's optimization problem. Consider the optimization problem faced by a bidder i with value v i in the first price auction. A bidder's expected utility over possible bids
is the interim bid allocation rule faced by the bidder. Let b i be her best response bid given her value v i . If we plot the bid allocation rulex i (d) for any alternate bid d, thenũ i (b i ) is precisely the area of the rectangle in the lower right of Figure 1 .
When other bidders have realized values and submitted bids, there is a minimum or threshold bid a bidder must make to win,
x ] prevents bidders from bidding to receive allocation x . Fig. 2 imum of a player's reserve and the bids of all other bidders. We call this bidder i's pointwise threshold bid. As we are in the Bayesian setting, a bidder is not reacting to this pointwise threshold, but is acting in expectation over the types and actions of her competitors. These actions induce a distribution over threshold bids. The cumulative distribution function of threshold bids for a bidder i is precisely her bid allocation rulẽ x i .
We will also refer to thresholds using the probability of allocation that they represent achieving. Let τ i (x) refer to the smallest bid that achieves allocation of at least x, hence
be the cumulative distribution function of the highest bids from other bidder. Then τ i (x) is either the reserve r i or the bid required to beat the highest bid from other agents a x fraction of the time, τ i (x) = max(r i , B −1 −i (x)). 1 For an alternate allocation probability x , the cumulative additional threshold
x xi τ i (z) dz will be used as a measure of how much more expensive it is for a bidder to get allocation x > x i . This is illustrated in Figure 2b .
Relating Contribitions to First-Price and Optimal Welfare. Let x * be the allocation rule from the welfare optimal mechanism that serves no agent with value
, and we can view v i x * i (v i ) as a bidder's contribution to the optimal welfare. We will now aim to approximate each bidder's contribution individually, using the bidder's contribution to welfare in the first-price auction, i.e., v i x i (v i ), and a fraction of the revenue in the first-price auction:
Our proof proceeds in two steps:
(1) Value Covering: A bidder's contribution to welfare in the FPA r and cumulative additional threshold together approximate her contribution to welfare in any alternate allocation. (Lemma 3.2) (2) Revenue Covering: The revenue of the FPA r approximates the cumulative additional threshold for all agents. (Lemma 3.
3)
The final approximation result follows by summing the value covering condition across agents, taking expectation over values, and combining with revenue covering.
Bid Allocation Rule (a) Lemma 3.2 shows the shaded areas cover a (e − 1)/e fraction of the dashed box, bidder i's contribution to the optimal welfare (v i x * i (v i )).
Bid Allocation Rule (b) Lemma 3.5 shows the shaded areas cover an (e − 1)/e fraction of i's contribution to the optimal virtual welfare,
The proof can be done by comparison with Figure 3a . 
When value covering is used to approximate the welfare induced by an allocation rule x * i , the alternate allocation x used for every bidder and value will be precisely x = x * i (v i ). PROOF. We will prove value covering in two steps: first, by developing a lower bound T on the cumulative additional threshold T ; second, by optimizing the lower bound to get the right side of (2).
Lowerbounding T . In best responding, bidder i chooses an action which maximizes her utility. If b i is a best response bid, then for any alternate bid d,
vi−d . With equality, this bound gives an indifference curve for bidder i; it is the alternate bid allocation rule that would lead to her being indifferent over all reasonable bids (see Figure 2a )
(3)
The last inequality followed because
Holding v i x fixed and minimizing with re-
Combining (3) and (4) gives exactly our desired result, (2).
We now show that in the first price auction, the expected revenue is greater than the cumulative additional threshold for any alternate feasible allocation x , which we can then combine with value covering to give a welfare approximation result. While value covering depended critically on equilibrium (or at least on bidders best responding), revenue covering will only depend on the form of the first price auction, and will thus hold for arbitrary (not necessarily BNE) bidding strategies that satisfy a light participation requirement (that is always satisfied in BNE). We call a bidding strategy participatory if bidders always bid at least their reserve unless no bid in [r i , v i ] gives positive probability of allocation. LEMMA 3.3 (REVENUE COVERING). For any participatory bidding strategies s and alternative allocation x ,
PROOF. It suffices to show that for bidder i with value above her reserve,
Once (6) is shown, multiplying by x i , summing over agents, and observing that
, z] is convex in z concludes the lemma:
We now show (6). By the participatory assumption, a bidder i with value above her reserve bids above her reserve r i . Thus the cumulative additional threshold when playing s i (v i ) is bounded by the cumulative additional threshold when bidding the reserve,
Then, using the definition of T and the monotonicity of B −1 −i (x), we have:
As the revenue of a first price auction is the expected highest bid, and B −1 −i (z) is the inverse of the cumulative distribution function of highest bid from bidders aside from i,
Chaining (8) and (9) gives
We now combine value and revenue covering to attain an approximation to the optimal welfare. PROOF OF THEOREM 3.1. We apply value covering and revenue covering with x = x * (v). Taking expectation of (2) over all players and values and combining with (5) gives WELFARE(FPA r ) + REV(FPA r ) ≥ e−1 e WELFARE(OPT r ). As WELFARE(FPA r ) ≥ REV(FPA r ), WELFARE(FPA r ) is then a 2e/(e − 1) approximation to OPT r .
The following are the main ideas and differences between the proof above and the proof of Syrgkanis and Tardos [2013] that enables treatment of reserve prices. The Syrgkanis and Tardos [2013] result can be viewed as combining value covering and revenue covering in one step (via the smoothness definition). Their equation has bidders' utilities where we have the bidders' surpluses and they have the full cumulative threshold where we have the cumulative additional threshold. The thresholds that a bidder faces that correspond to bids of other bidders translate to revenue and can be thus bounded by a revenue covering argument. Reserve prices, however, induce thresholds that do not correspond to bids of other bidders. A participatory bidder, however, will bid above the reserve when her value is above the reserve. Therefore, this bidder's payment will always compensate for the part of the threshold distribution that corresponds to the reserve price. Because we use surplus instead of utility our analysis loses a factor of two on the no-reserves bound of Syrgkanis and Tardos [2013] . 2
Revenue
In the tradition of Bayesian mechanism design, we will prove the revenue approximation result by reducing to the welfare approximation above. Let x * i now denote the allocation rule from the revenue optimal auction, given by Theorem 2.1. For revenue, we will instead approximate each bidders contribution to the optimal virtual welfare,
In a regular environment, monopoly reserves at r i = φ i (v i ) for each bidder will result in no bidder being served with a negative virtual value. Thus approximating the optimal virtual surplus using only agents with positive virtual values will be sufficient to approximate the expected surplus of the optimal auction. THEOREM 3.4. In any BNE of the first price auction with monopoly reserves (FPA r ) in a regular environment, the revenue is at least a 2e e−1 -approximation to revenue of the optimal auction.
Recall that in the welfare proof, the expected threshold bid plus BNE welfare approximated each bidders contribution to optimal welfare (Lemma 3.3). For revenue, we will use the expected threshold bid and each bidders BNE virtual welfare to approximate their virtual welfare in OPT.
LEMMA 3.5 (VIRTUAL VALUE COVERING). In any BNE of the FPA r , for any bidder
PROOF. This follows directly from value covering (Lemma 3.2) -see Figure 3b for an illustration. Combining 0 ≤ φ i (v i ) ≤ v with (12) gives
e . Multiplying through by φ i (v i )x gives our desired result. PROOF OF THEOREM 3.4. As no agents with negative virtual values are served, the revenue is larger than both terms on the left side of (10) when summed over all agents and values, so
Thus REV(FPA r ) is at least a 2e e−1 approximation to REV(OPT).
FRAMEWORK
In equilibria of the single-item first price auction, we observed that agents with low expected utility had high expected threshold bids. Because high thresholds were con-nected to high payments, we could conclude that the first price auction is both approximately welfare-and revenue-optimal. The goal for this section is to build up a framework for making this same argument for mechanisms with different payment semantics, such as all-pay auctions. In particular, we seek to prove results about behavior in Bayes-Nash equilibrium while ignoring the particular payment semantics of each auction. We begin by defining equivalent bids, which allow us to reduce the optimization problem a bidder faces in any auction to the problem faced in a first-price auction. This will allow us to reduce much of the analysis in general single-parameter auctions to the single-item first-price auction analysis of Section 3.
Equivalent Bids
Utility-maximizing agents must balance two objectives: getting allocated frequently, and getting allocated cheaply. In a first-price auction, agents bid to explicitly specify the tradeoff they are willing to make: their bid is the price they pay per unit of allocation. In general mechanisms, for any agent i and any action a i , define the equivalent bid for an action a i to be β i (a i ) =p i (a i )/x i (a i ); this can be thought of as the price per unit of allocation for that action. For first-price auctions, this is exactly the bid. For mechanisms with different payment semantics, β i (a i ) can still be thought of as an equivalent first-price bid for action a i .
Equivalent Threshold Bid. In proving Theorem 3.1, we noted that b is the minimum payment necessary to get the allocation probabilityx i (b). We used this property to bound the distribution of other agents' bids. For auctions where this relationship is less clear, we think of agents partitioning the actions in their choice set by interim allocation probability, then for each probability consider only the cheapest such action in terms of price per unit of allocation. For each allocation probability z, define α i (z) to be the action which minimizes β i (α i (z)) subject to x i (α i (z)) ≥ z, and the equivalent threshold bid τ i (z) to be the value of β i (α i (z)). 3 This captures exactly what we need: τ i (z) is the minimum price per unit needed to get allocation probability at least zexactly the notion that the inverse CDF of the first-price bid allocation rule satisfied in the proof of Theorem 3.1. Note that τ i (z) depends on s. For notational convenience, we suppress the strategy profile as an argument.
Cumulative Equivalent Threshold Bid. We can now use τ i (z) to track the expense an agent faces from increasing their allocation. Specifically, assume an agent is playing some action a i and seeks to increase their allocation probability to x . The barrier to i doing so is the collection of equivalent threshold bids in [x i (a i ), x ]. We can use this notion to measure i's expense for additional allocation. Define the cumulative equivalent threshold bid as
This quantity will function identically to its counterpart in Section 3, trading off against i's surplus as in Lemma 3.2, and translating into revenue Lemma 3.3. Note that because τ i (z) is nondecreasing in z,
Covering Conditions and the Price of Anarchy
We now use equivalent bids and thresholds in place of first-price bids and thresholds to develop general analogues of the key value and revenue covering conditions in Section 3.
LEMMA 4.1 (VALUE COVERING). Consider a mechanism M in BNE with induced allocation and payment rules (x, p), and an agent i with value v i . For any x ∈ [0, 1],
The proof can now be done by reduction to the single-item first-price auction (Lemma 3.2) because bidders now face effectively the same optimization problem as in a single-item first-price auction. The proof is left to the full version of the paper. To prove an approximation result for welfare or revenue, the only mechanism-specific detail which remains is specifying the relationship between T i and the mechanism's revenue.
Intuitively, we saw in Section 3 that if there is a relationship between revenue and the difficulty an agent faces in increasing their allocation once they have chosen to participate in the mechanism, then value covering allows us to show a welfare bound. To make this relationship concrete, we extend the definition of Lemma 3.3
Definition 4.2. A mechanism M is µ-revenue covered if for any (implicit) strategy profile s, feasible allocation x , and action profile a, µREV(M )
Note that Definition 4.2 makes no mention of BNE. It must hold for any strategy profile. This is a stronger condition than Lemma 3.3, as it is not restricted to bidders with values above a set of reserves or bidders playing only participatory strategies.
As we already saw, revenue covering has a number of important consequences. First is a welfare bound. THEOREM 4.3. If a mechanism is µ-revenue covered, then in any BNE, it is a (1 + µ) e e−1 −approximation to the welfare of the optimal mechanism. PROOF. Let x * be the welfare-optimal allocation rule. For any value profile v,
Summing over agents and using revenue covering gives
Taking expectation with respect to v and using WELFARE(M ) ≥ REV(M ), we get (1 + µ) e e−1 REV(M ) ≥ e e−1 WELFARE(OPT).
Restricted Revenue Covering
Smoothness approaches hinge on proving price of anarchy bounds in a restricted way. The restricted proofs imply extensions to broader environments. Our framework operates in this spirit, and to obtain a reserves extension, we impose similar restrictions.
Restrictions for Reserves. Revenue covering is useful for bounding revenue and welfare because it allows the mechanism to make up in revenue for the fact that in BNE, agents might find it too expensive increase their allocation probability to that which they would receive from an optimal allocation rule. That is, the agents for whom revenue covering matters are specifically those being served by the optimal mechanism. It therefore makes sense that if we seek to approximate the welfare or revenue of a mechanism that restricts those it serves, for example, with reserves, we only need revenue covering to pertain to agents served by the benchmark mechanism.
Reserves pose one additional problem for arguing about revenue covering. As we saw in Section 3, adding reserves to an auction changes the threshold bids an agent faces. Whereas with no reserves a threshold corresponded directly to revenue, a threshold in a mechanism with reserves may also correspond to the reserve itself and hence not revenue. We need a way of discerning which thresholds are useful for revenue and which are not.
We thus introduce revenue covering restricted to certain agents. This will allow us to prove approximation results for only a certain set of bidders -for example, the set of bidders with values above their reserves. We will use a function S(v) to specify which such bidders are revenue covered. In the case of individual reserves r = (r 1 , . . . , r n ),
It is these agents whose optimal welfare or virtual welfare we seek to approximate, and so they are the ones for whom we would like revenue covering to hold.
So long as such agents are bidding above their reserves if they have any chance of winning, revenue covering will hold. We call such actions participatory. Given a strategy profile s and value profile v, define an action a i to be participatory for s and v if β i (a i ) ≤ v i and eitherx i (a i ) > 0 or there's no a i such thatx i (a i ) > 0 and β i (a i ) ≤ v i .
Definition 4.4. A mechanism M is µ-revenue covered with respect to S if for all alternate allocations x , value profiles v, and profiles of participatory actions a,
Using our restriction to reserves, we can compare the welfare of a revenue-covered mechanism to that of the optimal mechanism with reserves. In Section 5, we show how to use these welfare results with reserves to bound revenue as well. The welfare theorem below, stated for general S, is most intuitive when S selects the agents in v who are above vector of reserves r = (r 1 , . . . , r n ).
THEOREM 4.5. For any S mapping value profiles to sets of agents, if a mechanism M is µ-revenue covered with respect to S, then the welfare of M is a (1 + µ)e/(e − 1)approximation to the welfare of the optimal mechanism which only serves agents in S(v) for every v.
PROOF. Let x * be the welfare-optimal allocation rule, and consider some value profile v. Lemma 4.1 with x = x * i (v) yields that for each x and value
. Note that in BNE, agents always play participatory actions. It follows that summing over all agents in S(v) and using revenue covering yields:
Taking expectation with respect to v and noting that x * doesn't serve agents not in S(v), we get WELFARE(M ) + µREV(M ) ≥ e−1 e WELFARE(OPT) and hence (1 + µ) e e−1 REV(M ) ≥ e e−1 WELFARE(OPT). Covering-Preserving Reserves. In many environments, it is possible to add reserves to a revenue covered mechanism and preserve revenue covering in the sense of Definition 4.4. As a result, the BNE welfare of the reserves mechanism approximates the welfare of the optimal mechanism with the same reserves. In the appendices of the full version of this paper, we provide a general set of conditions under which reserves preserve revenue covering in this manner. These conditions hold, for example, in firstprice matroid and position auctions, as well as under simultaneous composition. These mechanisms with reserves consequently meet the conditions of Lemma 4.5, yielding a welfare approximation, and as we show in the next section, a revenue approximation.
REVENUE APPROXIMATION
Recall that by Myerson's characterization of Bayes-Nash equilibrium (Lemma 2.2), the expected revenue can be viewed as the expected virtual welfare of agents served. We will consider the task of approximating the revenue of the optimal auction in two parts: showing that the virtual welfare from positive virtual-valued agents approximates the optimal revenue, and demonstrating a few methods to ensure that the virtual welfare from agents with negative virtual values does not hurt revenue too much.
Positive Virtual Value Approximation
In Theorem 3.4 of Section 3, we showed that the first-price auction with monopoly reserves had approximately optimal revenue, via a reduction to the welfare approximation result. We show in this section that the same approach suffices to show that for any µ-revenue covered mechanism, the revenue accounted for by positive virtual valued agents approximates the optimal revenue.
Definition 5.1. Let the positive and negative virtual values for an agent be φ
respectively. Define the positive and negative virtual welfare of a mechanism to be REV
Our primary result in this section is that REV + (M ) is a constant approximation to the revenue of the optimal mechanism if M is µ-revenue covered. Thus, bounding the loss from REV − as a fraction of REV + is sufficient to show approximately optimal revenue. THEOREM 5.2. In any BNE of a µ-revenue covered, single-parameter mechanism M , the positive virtual welfare REV + (M ) is a (µ + 1) e e−1 approximation to the revenue of the optimal mechanism. More precisely, REV + (M ) + µREV(M ) ≥ e−1 e REV(OPT). Recall that the approximation bound for µ-revenue covered auctions (Theorem 4.3) relied on showing that the surplus from any agent in any alternate allocation was approximated by that player's contribution to BNE surplus and a fraction of the additional threshold.
We begin by showing virtual-value covering, an analogue of value covering for virtual welfare, holds in BNE directly via a reduction to value-covering (Lemma 4.1).
LEMMA 5.3 (VIRTUAL-VALUE COVERING). Consider a mechanism M in BNE and an agent i with value v i . For any x ∈ [0, 1],
The proofs of Lemma 5.3 and Theorem 5.2 follow precisely as in Lemma 3.5 via a reduction to value-covering (Lemma 4.1), so the details are omitted. Now that the positive virtual welfare of a mechanism approximates the optimal, the only thing left is to bound the loss due to serving bidders wiht negative virtual values. The subsequent sections discuss methods for mitigating the virtual welfare lost from to serving negative virtual valued agents.
Reserve Prices
The standard approach to prevent service to agents with negative virtual values is to set reserves such that no negative virtual valued agent is served. As long as the virtual value φ i (v i ) is non-decreasing in v i -equivalently, the distribution is regularsetting monopoly reserves r * s.t. r * i = φ −1 i (0) in a first-price auction for every agent will eliminate all negative virtual valued agents. If a (general) mechanism can implement such reserves and serve no agent with φ i (v i ) < 0, then it too will approximate the revenue of the optimal mechanism: LEMMA 5.4. In any BNE of a µ-revenue covered mechanism M r * with monopoly reserves r * in a regular environment, the revenue of M r * is a (µ+1)e/(e−1) approximation to the revenue of the optimal mechanism.
The proof is straightforward -as M r * serves no agent with φ i (v i ) < 0, REV − (M r * ) = 0. By Theorem 5.2, M r * is then a (µ + 1)e/(e − 1) approximation to the revenue optimal mechanism. Thus if it is possible to add monopoly reserves to a mechanism, doing so gives approximately optimal revenue.
In a first price auction it is always feasible to implement reserves by restricting the bid-space. In an all-pay auction however, we cannot reliably implement value space monopoly reserves. The willingness of a player to outbid an all-pay reserve depends on the allocation probability as well as the reserve, and as such there is no easy correspondence between all-pay and value space reserves.
Duplicate bidders
Another approach to mitigating the impact of negative virtual-valued agents is to ensure each agent faces adequate competition. Bulow and Klemperer [1996] show that this intuition guarantees approximately optimal revenue in regular, symmetric, singleitem settings.
We show the same intuition holds for µ-revenue covered mechanisms: if each bidder must compete with at least k − 1 other bidders with values drawn from her same distribution and bidders play by identical strategies, revenue is approximately optimal compared to the revenue optimal mechanism (including the duplicate bidders). We say such an auction satisfies k-duplicates, and show in the appendix of the full version of this paper that both the first-price and all-pay auctions with at least k bidders from each distribution satisfy it.
LEMMA 5.5. In any BNE of a mechanism M with k-duplicates behaving by identical strategies and values drawn from regular distributions, the virtual surplus lost due to serving agents with negative virtual values is at most 1/k the virtual surplus from positive virtual valued agents.
The proof is included in the appendix of the full version of this paper, as well as proofs that the first-price and all-pay auctions satisfy k-duplicates when at least k bidders have values drawn from each distribution.
REVENUE COVERING
In this section we prove that several commonly-used and well-studied mechanisms are revenue covered, implying new revenue results for each. All proofs are included in the appendices of the full version of this paper.
First Price Matroid Auctions
In our discussion of the single-item case (Section 3), we saw that when an agent has trouble getting allocated in a first price auction (that is, T i is high), it is because other agents submit high bids. These competing bids translate into revenue, implying that the first-price auction is 1-revenue covered. With one extra step, this reasoning extends to first-price auctions where the feasible allocations form a matroid. An agent's threshold bid doesn't precisely correspond to a competing bid, but matroid properties provide a sufficiently close analog, implying revenue covering revenue covering. LEMMA 6.1. The first-price auction is 1-revenue covered in any matroid feasibility environment.
Combining Lemma 6.1 with Theorem 4.3 and Lemma 5.4 respectively imply welfare and revenue approximations of 2e/(e − 1) with reserves.
Position Auctions
In first-price position auctions (ie generalized first-price auction, or GFP), arguments similar to those in the matroid case yield analogous welfare and revenue guarantees.
Formally, a position auction is an auction in which agents can be allocated one of m positions; each of which is valued by an agent at α j v i . In advertising auctions, these are slots on a webpage to fill, each of which sees worse and worse click-through rates.
Order the positions such that {α j } is decreasing in j (hence slot 1 is best).
In the GFP, agents submit bids b i , and positions are allocated in order of bid. Each agent pays their bid scaled by the quality of the slot: α j b i . Equivalently, they pay their bid when they are served, which occurs with probability α j for position j. THEOREM 6.2. The generalized first price (GFP) auction is 1-revenue covered.
As in the matroid case, Theorem 4.3 and Lemma 5.4 respectively imply welfare and revenue approximations of 2e/(e − 1) with reserves.
All-Pay Auctions
By translating the all-pay auction into first-price semantics, the covering framework can be applied to yield welfare and revenue results. The welfare result is weaker than that in Syrgkanis and Tardos [2013] , but illustrates the applicability of the framework beyond first-price auctions. The revenue results we derive are new. LEMMA 6.3. The all-pay matroid auction is 2-revenue covered.
Theorem 4.3 implies a welfare bound of 3e/(e − 1). It is not feasible to add reserves to an all-pay auction, but if every bidder must compete against at least one duplicate bidder (as discussed briefly in Section 5), the all-pay auction is a 4e/(e − 1)-approximation to the optimal auction.
The Second-Price Auction
Not all mechanisms are revenue covered. One such mechanism that lacks a direct relationship between thresholds and revenues is the second-price auction. In the secondprice auction, agents submit sealed bids, the highest bidder wins and is charged the second-highest bid. Consider a two-agent setting where bidders have deterministic values v 1 = 1 and v 2 = . Assume agent 1 bids 1 and agent 2 bids . The revenue is , but T 2 [0, 1] is 1, so the second-price auction cannot be revenue covered.
EXTENSION: SIMULTANEOUS COMPOSITION
In this section we prove that if a mechanism satisfies revenue covering when operated in isolation, then it is similarly covered when many instances of the mechanism are simultaneously being run. Specifically, we assume agents are unit-demand and singlevalued. In this setting, we define simultaneous composition as:
Definition 7.1. Let mechanisms M 1 , . . . , M m have allocation and payment rules (x j , p j ) and individual action spaces spaces A 1 i , . . . , A m i for each agent i. Let S i be a non-empty subset of {1, . . . , m} for each i. The simultaneous composition of M 1 , . . . , M m is defined to have: -Action space j A j i for each agent. That is, each agent participates in the global mechanism by participating in each composed mechanism individually.
-Allocation rulex i (a) = max j∈Six j i (a j ). In other words, each agent choose their best allocation from among the composed mechanisms that interest them. -Payment rulep i (a) = jp j i (a j ). That is, agents make payments to every composed mechanism.
Given a strategy s in the composed mechanism, let s j denote the strategy profile in mechanism j defined by the element of each agent's strategy profile corresponding to M j . Given s j , define τ j i , and T j i to be the analogous values of τ i , and T i in M j under s j . In the composed mechanism, let A j i be the set of actions comprised of an arbitrary action in mechanism j and withdrawing from all other mechanisms. Further let A i = j A j i , and A = i A i .
With this notation defined, we present the main theorem -revenue covered mechanisms are closed under simultaneous composition.
LEMMA 7.2. Let M be the simultaneous composition mechanisms M j for j = 1, . . . , m, and let the individual mechanisms be µ-revenue covered. Then M is µ-revenue covered with respect to A .
The proof is included in the full version of this paper. Lemma 7.2 immediately yields a welfare approximation result and when combined with restrictions to handle reserves yields a revenue approximation result.
CONCLUSION
We have shown a framework for proving price of anarchy results for welfare and revenue in Bayes-Nash Equilibrium. This framework enabled us to prove both welfare and new revenue approximation results for non-truthful auctions in asymmetric settings, including first price and all-pay auctions in broad environments.
We split this framework in two very distinct parts that isolate the contribution of the mechanism and the contribution of Bayes-Nash Equilibrium. The first part, value covering, depends only on Bayes-Nash Equilibrium and relates an agents surplus and expected threshold price for allocation with her optimal surplus.
The second, revenue-covering, depends only on properties of a mechanism over individually rational strategy profiles and feasible allocations. This is especially helpful when equilibria are hard to characterize or understand analytically, as is the case with the first-price auction in asymmetric settings. This has been a barrier in the past to proving results about the behavior of non-truthful auctions in asymmetric settings: we hope this framework will aid broadly in understanding properties of equilibria in auctions well beyond the confines of symmetric settings.
Extensions. We used the characterization of Bayes-Nash equilibrium in a few very specific places in our proofs. For value-covering and virtual-value covering, it is only important that an agent be best responding to the expected actions of other bidders. For the revenue approximation results, we do rely on the characterization of equilibrium by [Myerson 1981 ] to account for revenue via virtual values. This is the crucial part that allows us to relate the allocation a bidder receives to their contribution to revenue. Extensions beyond single-parameter, risk-neutral, private-valued agents will likely need at least an approximate virtual-value equivalent.
